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8.1  Introduction: The Youth Unemployment Problem 
Public concern about youth employment problems in the U.S. derives 
from three facts: (1) the unemployment rate of  young people is high in 
absolute numbers, both in relation to adult unemployment and in com- 
parison with other countries; (2) unemployment rates of black youths are 
much higher and a large fraction of  nonworking black youths does not 
even search for jobs: (3) youth unemployment rates have increased in 
recent years. The trend is not pronounced among whites, but the rate for 
black youths has risen from levels comparable to white rates in the 1950s 
to the present depressionlike levels. 
In this chapter we do not  address the problem  of  trends. It is  an 
important question for assessing the plight of  black youths and a smaller 
one  for the white population beyond the adverse but temporary conjunc- 
tion of the business and demographic cycles. Rather, our question refers 
to the more permanent fact of  high youth unemployment. Why is it so 
high? Are there criteria by which we can judge that it is too high? Why 
does it decline with age in a particular fashion? 
Recent developments in the economics of  labor markets provide two 
complementary approaches to the understanding of  differential unem- 
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ployment. Search models are applicable, in principle, to the analysis of 
duration of unemployment, as they highlight the conditions under which 
job search terminates. On the other hand, episodes of  unemployment 
originate in the context of job or  interlabor force moves, so that models of 
labor turnover are most useful in understanding the incidence of unem- 
ployment. Since age differences in the incidence of  unemployment are 
even larger than differences in unemployment rates, we emphasize labor 
turnover as the main framework for analyzing the relationship between 
age and unemployment. We also employ a search model which captures 
some relevant aspects of the age differentials in job separation and in the 
duration of  unemployment. 
Our data sets are the panels of  men in  the National Longitudinal 
Surveys (NLS) and in the Michigan Income Dynamics surveys (MID). 
The data lend themselves to several analyses with which we attempt to 
illuminate the structure of unemployment. In section 8.2  we decompose 
the “unemployment rate” observed in a period into incidence, or propor- 
tion of persons experiencing unemployment some time during the period, 
and average duration of  unemployment during the period. This enables 
us to assess the relative importance of each component in creating unem- 
ployment differentials among age or any other population subgroups. 
We observe the incidence and duration of  unemployment in periods 
longer than a year in section 8.3.  The rate at which incidence and duration 
increase as the period is lengthened indicates the degree of persistence of 
unemployment or its converse, the degree of turnover among the unem- 
ployed. The observed degree of persistence may be due to positive serial 
correlation in the probability of  experiencing unemployment for given 
individuals, or to heterogeneity in this probability across individuals, or 
both.  These  categories  cannot  be  distinguished by  lengthening  the 
period, but are explored in regression analyses (section 8.5). 
In section  8.4  we  relate  current  unemployment  incidence P(u) to 
current labor mobility, defined as the probability of job separation from 
the current employer P(s).  We compare P(u)  and P(s)  over the life-cycle 
and by length of job tenure. The apparent absence of “aging effects” on 
the incidence of unemployment is tested in comparisons of  youths with 
migrants. According to the identity P(u)  = P(s).P(u  Is),  factors under- 
lying labor mobility P(s) ought to account for some of  the patterns of 
incidence P(u)  ,  especially when recall unemployment is excluded from 
P(u).  We explore the factors underlying the probabilities P(s)  and P(u)  in 
regression analyses in section 8.5. 
Further insights into differences in conditional unemployment P(u  I s) 
and in duration of  unemployment are obtained in a search model pre- 
sented in section 8.6. This model also carries implication for quit/layoff 
behavior and for wage changes connected with separations and unem- 
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Section 8.7 is a replication of regression analyses on data for blacks and 
an analysis of  the racial differentials. 
8.2  Components of  Unemployment 
The same rate of  unemployment is observed during a survey week 
when a certain proportion of the labor force is unemployed two months 
on average or when only one-third of that proportion is unemployed for a 
period of six months. The rate does not tell us whether a large number of 
those affected share a small burden or whether the opposite is the case. If 
the observation period is sufficiently long, the rate can be decomposed 
into incidence and duration of unemployment. Whether or not time spent 
in unemployment is to be interpreted as distress or as productive activity, 
we  want to know whether it is incidence or duration which is mainly 
responsible for the differences in particular comparisons of  population 
groups. 
To do this we may define a personal unemployment rate during the 
period (e.g., a year) by  the ratio of  weeks spent in unemployment to 
weeks spent in the labor force: 
A simple average of ui  would measure the group unemployment rate in 
an average week if each person spent the same number of weeks per year 
in the labor force. Otherwise the individual ui  must be weighted by his 
time in the labor force WLi  in averaging. As a result the group rate is 
obtained in: 
where N is the number of  persons unemployed some time during the 
period, L the number of people in the labor force some time during the 
period. Nl  L is the incidence of unemployment during the period. wu  is 
the average fraction of the period spent in unemployment by the unem- 
ployed, wL  the average fraction of  the time period spent in the labor 
force by the labor force group, and wo = 1 -  wL. 
Table 8.1 provides decompositions of  unemployment experience by 
the NLS samples of young and mature men for the years 1969-71.  The 
young men ranged in age between 17 and 27, the older men were 48  to 62 
years old. The men are classified by school enrollment status, educational 
attainment, and race. Unemployment followed by a return to the same 
employer (“recall” or “temporary layoff’) is excluded from table 8.1, but 
is included in appendix tables.’ The left-hand panel shows the compo- 238  Linda Leighton and Jacob Mincer 
Table 8.1  Decomposition of Incidence, Duration, and Nonparticipation 
NLS, 1969-71 (Excludes  Temporary Layoffs) 
Levels 
N  1  -  - 
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N  1  -  - 
U  L  W.,  (1 -  ii"? 
Young blacks minus young 
whites  .545  .332  ,193  .022 
Students  ,525  ,243  .229  ,052 
Nonstudents  .648  ,478  .127  ,049 
whites  1.02  1.29  -  ,354  ,087 
minus mature whites  .801  1.04  -  .250  .006 
blacks  1.10  1.36  -  ,356  .091 
minus mature blacks  ,976  1.26  -  .319  .032 
whites  .473  .257  ,195  .019 
Young whites minus mature 
Nonstudent young whites 
Young blacks minus mature 
Nonstudent young blacks 
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Table 8.1 (continued) 
Percent Differentials 
Education: 
less than H.S. minus H.S. 
Nonstudent whites  .273  ,226  ,011  ,032 
Mature whites  .515  .209  .264  ,039 
Nonstudent whites  .522  .367  .136  ,018 
Mature whites  -  .192  -  ,012  -  ,166  -  .m 
H.S.  minus >H.S. 
NOTE:  = proportion of  time spent unemployed by unemployed. 
Wo  = proportion of time spent out of  the labor force by labor force participants. 
3 = incidence of  unemployment. 
L 
n  = sample size. 
nents of  levels of  unemployment. The nonparticipation component 1  / 
1 -  w,  is the major one among students in the period 1966-69 though not 
in 1969-71 .z  It is followed in relative importance by incidence and dura- 
tion. Among the young, incidence exceeds duration in producing the 
unemployment total, while the opposite is true with the older groups. 
Both incidence and duration are greater with blacks than whites and with 
the less educated youths compared to the more ed~cated.~  In the right- 
hand  panel,  percent  differentials  in  the unemployment  rate  and its 
components are calculated for selected groups. Clearly, higher unem- 
ployment rates of  the young are attributable to higher probabilities of 
unemployment; duration actually works in the opposite direction. While 
duration always increases with age in the white sample, the age differen- 
tial for blacks is quite small for 1966-67 and 196749. 
On average, almost 40% of all unemployed older men were on tempo- 
rary layoffs and were recalled by the employer, while about 18% of the 
nonstudent young unemployed workers were recalled. Inclusion of recall 
unemployment shows a narrowing of  the age differential in both the 
incidence and duration components of unemployment. This is because of 
the greater proportion of  recall unemployment among older workers. 
A comparison of  decompositions for 1967-69 and 1969-71  provides 
information about cyclical  changes. Going from the tight labor markets of 
196769  to the recession years 1969-71  we find that duration of  unem- 
ployment shows a greater increase (proportionately twice as large) than 
incidence of  unemployment, and that the age differentials widen in 
incidence and narrow in duration. Both incidence and duration of  unem- 
ployment are more cyclically sensitive in the young than in the old labor 
force. Whatever the cycle phase, we conclude higher incidence is the 240  Linda Leighton and Jacob Mincer 
reason for higher youth unemployment. It is, therefore, the component 
of  major interest for our study. 
8.3  Short- and Long-run Unemployment Experience 
The longitudinal  data unable us  to observe the incidence and the 
amount of  time spent in unemployment over periods of several years. As 
indicated in table 8.2 the average incidence in a single year (p) in the 
1966-69  period was 13.5% for young white nonstudents. Over the three- 
year period it was P3 = 27.9%. For the same group the average number of 
weeks spent in unemployment during a single year was 7.7. It was 11.3 
over the three-year period. We may define “complete persistence” in 
unemployment experience when the same persons are unemployed in the 
three-year period as are in a single year. Then P3 =p  and W3  = 3w. 
“Complete turnover” is the opposite case, when those unemployed in 
one year are not unemployed in the other two years. Then P3 = 3p and 
W3  = w.  The actual figures are between the extremes, so that a significant 
degree of  persistence coexists with a great deal of  turnover. 
Table 8.2  Turnover and Persistence of Unemployment NLS,  1M9 
P  p,  pn  N  A 
Young whites 
Students  ,177  .370  .442  1023  .727 
Nonstudents  .135  .279  .353  803  .659 
Education 
0-8  ,220  ,458  ,526  118  .776 
9-1  1  .177  ,357  .442  196  ,679 
12  .lo4  .215  .281  377  .624 
13-15  ,113  ,235  ,301  68  .650 
16+  ,023  .068  -.067  44  1.04 
Students  ,296  .619  .650  29 1  ,910 
Nonstudents  .242  .454  .564  335  .658 
Mature whites  .067  .128  .187  3459  ,506 
Education 
G8  ,088  ,163  ,242  1274  ,488 
9-1  1  ,064  ,119  .180  708  .471 
12  .055  .lo9  .157  872  ,526 
13-15  .058  .124  .168  298  ,618 
16 +  .028  .064  ,082  343  ,667 
Mature blacks  ,095  .176  .258  1491  .496 
Young blacks 
NOTE: P, = the observed probability of  unemployment in an n-year period. 
p  = an average of  the n-year single probabilities. 
p,, = 1 - (1 -p)” assuming p is an independent yearly probability. 
A  =P,-p  - 
pn  -P 
N  = sample size. 241  Labor Turnover and Youth Unemployment 
There are two possible and not mutually exclusive reasons why the 
number of  people experiencing unemployment sometime in an n-year 
period is less then n-times the number of  unemployed in a single year. 
First, the experience of  unemployment in one year increases the prob- 
ability of becoming unemployed the next year. The events are dependent 
in probability because of time or tenure dependence: the longer a person 
stays in the job the less likely he is to separate, hence to become unem- 
ployed. The other possibility is independence in probability over time, 
but differences in sizes of  probability across people in the group: those 
with higher probabilities are more likely to be found unemployed at any 
time than are others. Both possibilities give rise to the persistence in 
observed incidence, so that P,<np  and W,> w. 
Let us consider the two cases separately. 
1.  The assumption of homogeneity, that is,pi = p for all individuals  i, 
with time independent probabilities yields an upper limit for P,  (it is 
clearly less than np, which would require a negative serial correlation). 
Denote the upper limit by Pn,  P,, = 1 -  (1 -p)".  The observed n-year 
incidence is P,  5  Pn,  and a natural measure4  of the degree of persistence is 
1 -  A, where A = P,, -PIP,,  -p. When A = 1, there is no persistence in 
the unemployment experience. 
2.  Assume independence, but heterogeneity. Here the group consists 
of individuals whosep, differ. Definep = E(pi)  and qi = 1 -pi, q = E(qi). 
Then E(pni)  = E[1 -  (1 -pi)"]  <  1 -  (1 -  p)", and 1 -  E[(qi)7  <  1 -  4". 
The inequality holds because, as is well known, E[(qi)"]  >  [E(q,)]".  In 
other words, if homogeneity and independence obtained within each of 
the subgroups differing in pi, the observed pn  would be smaller than pn 
expected on the assumption of homogeneity of  the whole group. 
In table 8.2, A = 65.9% for young white nonstudents, so the degree of 
persistence for this group is 34.1%;  it is 49.4%  for old NLS whites. Racial 
differences in  A  are small but they are not standardized by  education. 
Among the young, persistence is greater in groups with education levels 
above high school and it  does not change with age. Among the less 
educated, persistence  increases with  age. Apparently, tenure  depen- 
dence is weaker andlor heterogeneity smaller in the young less educated 
than in the more educated groups. According to our analysis in the next 
section, this is reasonable if  the less educated acquire less firm specific 
skills on the job. Over time there is a differentiation in these groups into 
people who acquire job attachments and others who continue to drift. 
The result is a growth of  tenure dependence and of  heterogeneity with 
age. 
Of course, the observed P, will be even smaller if  time dependence (or 
heterogeneity) obtains within the subgroups. Consequently, A <  1 may 
reflect heterogeneity or time dependence or both. The data in table 8.2 
cannot distinguish whether it is heterogeneity or time dependence which 242  Linda Leighton and Jacob Mincer 
produce a less than proportionate increase in incidence and in time spent 
in unemployment. Regression analyses described in section 8.5 explore 
these matters further and suggest that both factors are at work in produc- 
ing the result. 
8.4  Incidence of Unemployment and Labor Turnover: 
Experience and Tenure Profiles 
Since it is incidence that is responsible for high levels of youth unem- 
ployment, we direct our attention primarily to the analysis of  P(u)  and 
secondarily to the question why adult men experience longer spells of 
unemployment.  Spells of  unemployment  occur, if  at  all,  during job 
change or during movement between the nonmarket (household, school, 
the military) and the labor market. They also occur without job change in 
the case of  recalled workers on temporary layoffs. 
Unemployment incidence is definitionally related to labor turnover in 
the probability formula P(u)  = P(s)-P(u  I s) with recall unemployment 
excluded. For the sake of completeness, our findings include also recall 
unemployment (not shown in the text). 
Published data classified by  age show that the high  rates of  youth 
unemployment drop quite sharply to relatively low levels beyond the first 
half-decade of  working life. Table 8.3 shows the age profiles of  unem- 
Table 8.3  Job Mobditv and Unemolovment 
Men, 1961 
Employed in 1961  18-19  20-24  25-34  35-44  45-54  55-64 
Percent job changers (jc)  23.5  24.4  14.9  10.2  7.1  4.0 
Percent of  jc unemployed  47.7  50.1  46.0  46.7  49.2  54.2 
Percent of  jc laid off  41.5  43.6  43.8  49.8  58.4  70.6 
Percent of  ic who quit  58.5  56.4  56.2  50.2  41.6  29.4 
SOURCE:  BLS, Special Labor Force Report no.  35, Job Mobility in 1961. 
Men, 1977 
18-19  20-24  25-34  35-44  45-54  554 
Percent with job 
tenure less than a 
year in Jan. 1978"  69.8  49.6  27.6  16.2  10.5  8.9 
Percent with 
unemployment 
during 1977b  34.5  32.2  17.7  11.8  10.2  9.6 
SOURCES:  Job Tenure of Workers,  January  1978, and Work Experience of  the Population in 
1977, unpublished, BLS. 
NOTES:  "Employed in January 1978. 
labor force some time during the year. Includes temporary layoff unemployment. 243  Labor Turnover and Youth Unemployment 
ployment in relation to labor mobility. The upper panel, based on a 1961 
BLS survey (the last available survey of this kind), shows the incidence of 
unemployment  among job changers. It suggests strongly that the age 
profile of  unemployment is very much a reflection of  the typical age- 
mobility profile. Almost half  of  the job changers became unemployed 
during the year, although this proportion increased somewhat with age. 
In the lower panel mobility is defined more broadly as the proportion of 
the labor force that has held the current job (with the current employer) 
less than a year in January 1978. Unemployment incidence among all 
men in the labor force and not merely among job changers is shown in the 
lower row of  the lower panel. Here the age curve of  incidence is also 
convex as is the mobility curve, but flatter, expecially  beyond age 35. This 
is because (1)  temporary layoff unemployment is included in the figures, 
which almost doubles the incidence at older ages, and (2), even when 
temporary layoffs are excluded, the quitllayoff ratios decline  with age 
(see rows 3 and 4 of the upper panel). Since the probability of unemploy- 
ment is higher following layoffs than quitting, unemployment conditional 
on separations increases with age. In view of the relatively minor changes 
in conditional unemployment, the steep decline of youth unemployment 
in the early years of  experience can be attributed to the convex shape of 
the age curve in labor mobility. 
Mincer and Jovanovic (1979) show that the age decline in job separa- 
tions is due primarily to the fact that the probability of separating declines 
with tenure in the current job, whether or not the separation is initiated 
by the worker or the employer. The theory underlying this relation is that 
the informational process of job matching and the accumulation of  spe- 
cific capital on the job create differences between worker productivity in 
the current job and elsewhere as well as differences between wages in 
current  and alternative employments.  The convexity of  the tenure- 
mobility profile is due to the initially sharp decline in the probability of a 
separation following a successful job-matching (“probation”)  period, 
and an eventual leveling off  of  P(s) following completion of  specific 
capital accumulation in the firm. The experience (working-age) profile of 
mobility is easily derived from the tenure profile. Givens =  f( T, x)  where 
s is the mobility (separation) rate, T length of  tenure, and x  length of 
experience in the labor market, 
(3) 
The negative slope of  the tenure curve (relation between tenure and 
separations)  aslaT diminishes  with  T,  and  dTldx  is  positive  and 
n~nincreasing.~  The convexity of  the experience mobility curve s(x) is 
thus due to the convexity of  the tenure curve. The “aging effect” aslax 
steepens the slope of the experience profile but does not affect its convex- 
ity. The aging effect represents declines of mobility with experience at 244  Linda Leighton and Jacob Mincer 
fixed levels of  tenure, and is pronounced in  quits but  not in layoffs 
(Mincer and Jovanovic, table 1). 
The longer a worker stays in a firm the less likely he is to separate. 
Consequently, he is less likely to become unemployed, unless separations 
after a longer stay in the firm carry a sufficiently higher risk of unemploy- 
ment. This may be true of  “permanent” (not recalled) layoffs which are 
less expected by higher tenured employees, while the opposite ought to 
hold for quits since the opportunity cost of unemployment increases with 
tenure. These predictions are weakly confirmed in MID regressions, not 
shown here. The opposing signs of  unemployment conditional on quit- 
ting, and layoff cancel in total separations so that P(u  Is) shows no clear 
pattern with tenure as is shown in table 8.4. 
Consequently, the tenure profile of unemployment should reflect the 
profile of separation, and the analyses of the experience profile of unem- 
ployment incidence can be represented equivalently to equation (3) in: 
(4) 
dp(u) -  aP(u) dT  aP(u)  +-  ---.- 
dx  aT  dx  ax 
Decline and convexity of the experience profile of unemployment is thus 
due, as was true of separations, to the sharp decline and convexity of the 
tenure profile of  incidence. 
A comparison of  tenure profiles of  incidence and of  separations is 
shown in table 8.4. Over the first few years of  tenure, the decline in 
unemployment incidence appears to be somewhat more rapid than the 
decline in separations for both age and race groups. Aside from a first 
year decline, the probability of unemployment conditional on separation 
P(u  I s) does not change systematically. However, as we already noticed in 
table 8.3, P(uls) is higher at older ages. 
Among blacks the age differential in P(u  Is) varies over the business 
cycle. It is observable for 1969-71,  but not for 1967-69. As noted before, 
a similar cycle pattern was observed in age differentials in duration. The 
age increase in P(u  I s)  arises mainly from the increase in the layoff/quit 
ratio (apparent in table 8.3), but also from an increase in the probability 
of  unemployment conditional on layoff P(u  I L).  However, P(u  I Q) de- 
creases slightly with age.6 
The age increase in the conditional probability P(u Is) is the reason for 
the absence of  an aging effect (aP(u)ldx in equation [4]) in unemploy- 
ment in the face of a significant aging effect in separations. At given levels 
of tenure the difference in P(u)  between the young and the old white men 
is small although the difference is evident among the blacks who show a 
stronger “aging effect” in separations (temporary layoffs excluded). The 
age differences also increase in the recession period 1969-71. 
We check on the age effect with the MID data which  covers the 
complete age range. The absence of  an aging effect in the probability of Table 8.4 
Tenure as 
Incidence of Unemployment by Tenure NLS,  1%7-69  (Excludes Temporary Layoffs and Students) 
Young white men  Young black men  Mature white men  Mature black men 
of  1967  P(v)  P(S)  P(UIS)  P(v)  P(S)  P(UIS)  P(v)  P(S)  P(UIS)  P(v)  P(S)  P(UIS) 
,244  .472  .491  .264  .472  .560  0  .262  .686  .381  .448  .753  .594 
1  .134  .444  .303  ,216  .581  .372  .090  .285  ,317  ,121  .258  .471 
2  .I07  .393  .271  ,128  ,282  ,454  .083  ,208  ,300  .300  ,367  ,818 
3  ,067  ,278  ,240  ,231  ,577  ,400  ,053  .187  .286  .167  ,208  ,800 
4  .069  ,327  ,294  .091  .546  .167  .092  ,277  .333  .119  ,190  .625 
5  ,077  .462  .I67  ,167  .333  .500  .050  .I17  .429  .161  .355  .454 
6  .059  .118  ,500  .Ooo  ,333  .Ooo  .051  .I36  .375  .I54  .231  .667 
7  .I25  .250  .500  .Ooo  .500  .Ooo  .046  .197  .231  ,050  ,100  ,500 
8  .Ooo  .400  .Ooo  .Ooo  .333  .Ooo  ,052  .I21  ,429  .069  .lo3  .667 
.050  .175  ,286  .059  ,176  .333  9  1.Ooo  1.Ooo  1.Ooo  -  -  - 
10-14  .500  .500  1.Ooo  .500  .500  1.OOo  .028  .089  ,320  ,046  .110  .417 
15-19  ,029  .089  .292  ,028  ,042  .500 
20-24  .044  .064  .625  .050  .115  .438 
>25  .024  ,081  .235  .032  ,105  .231 
,178  ,518  .342  .337  .642  ,525  .066  ,163  .382  .095  ,179  .519  Total 
n  (1065)  (552)  (410)  (263)  (2084)  (340)  (8922)  (160) 246  Linda Leighton and Jacob Mmcer 
unemployment of whites is confirmed in the MID data even though the 
period covered (1975-76)  was a period of high unemployment. A regres- 
sion of P(u)  on experience x,  defined as years spent in the labor force, 
yields the equation (t-ratios in parentheses): 
(2.7)  (1.8) 
P(u)  = .162 - .006~  +  .001~2  (5) 
When job tenure T is included in the equation, the effect of x vanishes. 
Tenure effects are strong: unemployment declines twice as rapidly over a 
year of  tenure than over a year of  experience. 
(6)  P(u) = .172 -  .002~  -  .00004~*  -  .0132T + .0003T2 
(.9)  (4  (4.3)  (2.8) 
Both the  experience profile in  (5) and the tenure  profile in (6) are 
convex.’ Clearly, P(u)  does not depend on x, but on T. In other words, 
unemployment declines with age not because of  aging but because of the 
lengthening of  tenure: dTldx>O and aP(u)ldx = 0 in equation (4). 
The conclusion must be that the short tenure level of the young is the 
main reason for the age differential in the incidence of  unemployment. 
By definition, new or recent entrants and reentrants into the labor market 
have short levels of tenure. The fact that their unemployment incidence is 
not higher than the incidence of older men at comparable levels of tenure 
suggests that it is not behavior or circumstances  peculiar to young people, 
but the dynamics of  “job shopping” in the labor market which is largely 
independent of  age. 
Does the finding of similar incidence at comparable tenure levels of the 
young and the old mean that youth unemployment is not excessively 
high? Not necessarily. One may argue that turnover is excessively high, 
so that tenure is unduly short among the young. One may also argue that 
older job movers with whom we are comparing the early tenured young 
represent an adverse selection of  unstable workers. There is some evi- 
dence that this suspicion is correct: older men with short tenure tend to  be 
persistent movers whose wages and wage progress over their careers are 
lower than those of  stayers, while such differences (between movers and 
stayers) are negligible among the young (Mincer and Jovanovic 1979, 
tables 5 and 6). 
Is it  excessive turnover or is  it  newness in  the labor market  that 
produces the high early unemployment of  the young? It is possible that 
among workers of  comparable quality a first encounter with the labor 
market produces more turnover and unemployment than at early levels 
of  tenure on any subsequent job. Being new in a labor market is an 
experience not restricted to the young. We may, for instance, compare 
the young with international and internal migrants of  all ages who also 
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adverse selection, indeed the opposite is argued and shown to be the case 
in migration studies (e.g., Chiswick 1978), their unemployment is not 
likely to reflect excessive turnover. 
Table 8.5 presents comparisons between the unemployment experi- 
ence of migrants (of all ages) and of young natives: while unemployment 
rates of  young nonmigrants (aged 18-24) are over twice as high as the 
rates of adult men, the rates of men who arrived in the U.S. from abroad 
were twice as high as the youth rate in all age groups (panel A). The 
reason the immigrant rates are higher is because they had at most only a 
year of  experience in the U.S.  labor market, certainly less that the 
(18-24)  youths had on average. Rates of  the immigrants are comparable 
to the unemployment rates of  men who entered or reentered the labor 
force during the year (panel B), and, indeed, are somewhat higher than 
the rates of young (18-24) men who have less than a year of  experience in 
the labor market. 
In panel C immigrants (regardless of age) are compared with natives of 
the same educational level (high school, the largest group) by years of 
experience in the U.S. labor market.  During the first two years the 
unemployment rate of immigrants is somewhat higher than of the young 
natives but it declines more rapidly. Initial handicaps (perhaps language) 
in settling in a job are overcome more quickly by immigrants. The slower 
Table 8.5 
(A) 
Unemployment Rates of Men by Migration Status 
Newly Arrived Migrants, March 1963 
(migration after March 1962) 
All  18-24  25-44  45-64 
Nonmigrants  5.5  11.2  4.8  4.8 
Migrants  12.2  15.5  9.2  16.7 
Immigrants  22.1  22.9  18.0  22.5 
(B)  Labor Force Entrants 
(not in labor force, March 1962; in labor force, March 1963) 
All  18-24  25-44  45-64 
Nonmigrants  20.0  19.6  18.5  23.0 
Migrants  18.6  21.5  15.0  22.4 
SOURCE:  BLS, Special Labor Force Report no 44, Geographic Mobility and Employment 
Status. 
(C)  Immigrants and Natives by Experience 
1970 Census Week 
Experience  0-2  2-4  4-6  6-8  8+ 
Natives  9.3  6.0  4.7  4.1  2.0 
Immierants  11.4  3.5  2.5  3.4  1.9 
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rate of  decline among the young reflects the change from  single to 
married status and from part-time, part-period to full-time, full-period 
work. Thus, although the high initial turnover and unemployment of the 
young men are no greater than those of immigrants, a group that is highly 
motivated and committed to the labor market, the decline in turnover 
and unemployment is slower. The growth of  commitment to the labor 
market takes time in the transition from dependent member of  parental 
household to head of  own family, with the mix of  school, leisure, and 
work shifting toward the latter in the allocation of time. The significance 
of these factors in affecting unemployment incidence is shown in regres- 
sion analyses to be described in the next section. 
Internal migrants represent a group which is intermediate in an infor- 
mational and cultural sense between immigrants and native experienced 
(nonmigrant) workers. Their unemployment rates are lower than those 
of immigrants during the first year in the new location and comparable to 
the rate of young nonmigrants (row 2 of panel A). Again, this comparison 
is biased because the young nonmigrants have had more than one year of 
labor market experience, while the  migrants have been only a year or less 
in the new location. 
Table 8.6 drawn from the NLS data, compares the incidence of unem- 
ployment of migrants during the first four years in the new labor market 
with the unemployment of young men with at most four years of  labor 
market experience in 1967. Migrants who were unemployed at origin just 
before  migrating were  eliminated  from  the sample so as to avoid a 
possible adverse selection which would bias upward the destination un- 
employment  of  migrants.  Within-firm geographic transfers were  also 
eliminated to avoid an opposite bias. Temporary layoffs were excluded, 
and the sample restricted to nonstudent, white men. The results are that 
incidence of  adult married migrants was 14%, about the same as for the 
young married men, and 19% for the nonmarried adult migrants com- 
pared to 26% for young single men. Inclusion of temporary layoff unem- 
ployment raises the figures for the young somewhat more than for the 
older migrants, the reverse of  the general case. 
We think it is fair to conclude that the major circumstance responsible 
for high youth unemployment is newness in the labor market rather than 
young age and unstable behavior. This is not to say, however, that the 
frequency of  unemployment among the young stands in an immutable 
ratio to that of  adults. Increases in young cohorts consequent on the 
“baby boom”  create larger proportions of  young workers with short 
tenure.  Similarly, longer schooling means that work  experience and 
tenure are shorter at a given age (e.g., 18 years), so that unemployment 
of young nonstudents is more prevalent (relative to adult unemployment) 
in countries with higher educational attainment. Of course, the partial 
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Table 8.6  Incidence of Unemolovment NLS White Men.  1967-69 
Not 
All  Married  married 
(excludes temporary layoffs) 
Mature men 
0-4 years residence 
in 1967  ,148  ,141 
It  (859)  (786) 
Young nonstudents 
experience 0-4 years 
in 1967  .189  ,128 
n  (644)  (344) 
Mature men 
Young nonstudents 
(includes temporary layoffs) 
0-4  years residence  ,168  .165 







NOTE: Respondents with unemployment in place of origin are deleted. 
family status is a factor in greater turnover as is the interruption of work 
experience by military service. Minimum wage legislation may also be 
important although its impact on employment and labor force participa- 
tion is probably stronger than on unemployment or on turnover (Mincer 
1976). Note that black youths were not included in our comparisons with 
migrants and we have already seen that their unemployment incidence 
exceeds not only that of whites but also that of black adults at comparable 
levels of tenure, especially in early tenure where most unemployment is 
concentrated. 
8.5  Factors Affecting the Incidence of Unemployment 
The apparently close relation between turnover and unemployment 
suggests that some or most of  the variables that affect separations are 
factors which also affect unemployment. We ascertain these factors and 
the similarity of  their effects in parallel regressions of separations and of 
unemployment incidence on the same set of  independent variables. 
As is well understood in the analysis of  labor mobility, the observed 
reduction of separation probabilities as tenure lengthens may be a statis- 
tical illusion rather than a description of  individual behavior. Suppose 
that individual propensities to move are not reduced by tenure but still 
differ  among  workers.  In  that  case, the estimated tenure  profile of 
mobility S( T)  observed across a sample of workers will have a downward 
slope and will be convex as well. Persons with high propensities to move 
separate at early levels of tenure while those with lower propensities stay 
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apparently declining tenure curve would level off at low separation rates 
in the long-tenured classes. 
Much the same phenomenon may be expected to appear in the statis- 
tical treatment of  umployment incidence. Unemployment risk may not 
be related to duration of job tenure, yet differences among individuals in 
the unemployment risk to which they are subject can create exactly the 
same spuriousness  in the tenure  profile,  given the  relation  between 
separation and unemployment. Actually, heterogeneity and “tenure de- 
pendence” are not mutually exclusive hypotheses regarding labor mobil- 
ity and unemployment incidence. Indeed, the theory of job sorting and of 
acquisition of  specific human capital implies heterogeneity in levels and 
slopes of tenure profiles (Mincer and Jovanovic 1979). Therefore heter- 
ogeneity does not fabricate an unreal tenure curve: it merely steepens the 
slope of the real (average) tenure curve. 
Differences in levels of  tenure profiles can be indexed by observations 
on past mobility behavior. If  so, their inclusion in the regression should 
reduce the bias in the tenure slope. Other measured factors represent 
heterogeneity not captured by the limited observations on past mobility. 
Their inclusion further reduces the tenure slope while increasing the 
explanatory power of  the regressions. 
A comparison of the separation and unemployment regressions shows 
that the probability of  unemployment is, just as labor mobility, subject to 
tenure dependence and that individual characteristics, such as education, 
health, marital status, local unemployment rate, and job training, affect 
the probabilities  of  separation  and  of  unemployment,  given tenure. 
These regressions appear in tables 8.8 and 8.9 for NLS young white 
nonstudents (1969-71), in tables 8.10 and 8.11 for the MID (1976-76), 
and in tables 8.12 and 8.13 for mature NLS men (1969-71). For the NLS, 
the dependent variables are defined as number of separations and num- 
ber of unemployment spells during the period; for the MID survey, as the 
probability of  separation and the probability of  unemployment respec- 
tively. Results are similar for both number and incidence of  events; 
however, we refer to both as incidence of unemployment and separation. 
Temporary layoffs are excluded. Comparable regressions covering the 
period 1967-69 for NLS, and 1973-74  for MID both including and exclud- 
ing recall unemployment  are available in the appendix.  With minor 
exceptions, inclusion of recall unemployment yields qualitatively similar 
results. Sample means of the independent variables appear in table 8.7. 
The following regression variables are used in the tables: 
X  Number of years since beginning the first job after leaving 
full-time school. 
T  Duration of  job held at beginning of  interval. 
JTRAZN  One if respondent received any training while employed in 
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Young  Mature  Young  Mature 
whites  whites  blacks  blacks  Whites 
X  4.63  35.64  4.45  37.02  18.65 
x2  33.31  1317.16  30.05  1424.30  515.59 
T  1.61  13.15  1.10  10.89  7.18 
T2  6.95  313.83  4.84  236.73  112.13 
JTRAIN  .221  -  .083 
PTRAIN  .369  -  ,228 
LOCRA TE  4.88  3.80  5.24  4.35  8.38 
PSEP  3.81  ,496  4.19  .570  .093 
PCOND  .163  .068  .328  ,111  .113 
EDUC  12.21  10.53  10.35  7.31  12.65 
HL TH  ,042  ,222  .020  ,192  ,074 
GOV  ,114  .187  .lo9  ,231  .l% 
UNION  .318  .378  .323  ,457  .308 
MARRY  .626  .912  .448  .800  .908 
PTIME  .137  .086  ,167  ,137  .030 
OLF  .328  ,200  .405  .253  .051 
SEP  352  .278  1.01  .323  - 
SEF  2.63  .541  2.73  339  - 
ENTRY  .472  -  ,601  -  .153 
n  1351  1957  504  866  1562 
-  - 














One if respondent received any training aside from regular 
school prior to job held at beginning of  interval. 
Unemployment rate for labor market of current residence. 
Prior separations per year since 1966 (NLS); probability of 
separation per year since 1968 (MID). 
Ratio of  prior unemployment spells to prior separations 
(NLS) ;  prior unemployment incidence (MID). 
Completed years of  education. 
One if  health is poor. 
One if  public employee. 
One if  wages are set by collective bargaining. 
One if  married, spouse present. 
One if  34 hour workweek or less. 
One if  incidence of  nonparticipation  in  current  period 
(NLS); one if incidence of  nonparticipation in prior years 
(MID). 
Number of  job separations. 
Number of  spells of  nonparticipation (NLS); one if inci- 
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Table 8.8  The Determinants  of Separations  for Young White Men, NLS  1969-71 
P  t  P  t  P  r 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
CONST  1.12  .749  1.50 
X  -.110  3.23  .064  1.76  .056  1.50 
xz  ,007  2.61  -.003  1.16  -.003  1.06 
T  -.264  4.99  -.188  4.70 
P  .022  3.36  .015  3.01 
JTRAIN  -.260  2.61  -.150  1.55 
PTRAIN  -.001  .oo  ,053  .92 
LOCRATE  ,014  .57  ,008  .34 
PSEP  .040  4.66  ,036  4.41 
PCOND  ,147  1.80  .045  .57 
EDUC  -.064  3.83 
HL  TH  -.202  1.16 
GOV  -.lo1  .99 
UNION  -.159  2.10 
MARRY  -.261  3.28 
PTIME  ,283  2.78 
OLF  .613  7.96 
R2  .008  ,102  ,173 
P  .852 
n  1351 
NOTE:  @ = regression coefficient. 
Y  = mean of  the dependent variable. 
The first column of  the separation and incidence regressions in tables 
8.8-8.13  shows an experience profile which disappears once tenure is 
added. This means that within the observed age range (which is limited in 
the NLS), probabilities of  both separation and unemployment are the 
same as given levels of tenure regardless of experience. In the complete 
age range (available in the MID data) the inclusion of tenure reduces but 
does not eliminate experience effects on separations. However, such 
“aging effects” are eliminated in the unemployment incidence equations. 
Next, the inclusion of  heterogeneity indices of  past behavior and of 
heterogeneity factors (col. 3) reduces the tenure slope in both separations 
and in unemployment incidence. Most of the reduction is achieved when 
prior mobility indices are added to tenure. As an example which holds in 
all the regressions, compare column 2 in table 8.11 with equation (6) 
above. Both prior separations (per year) and prior unemployment (con- 
ditional on separations) were used as indices in NLS. Prior unemploy- 
ment incidence is unconditional in MID. Tenure remains significant after 
all other variables are included. 
Two training variables were used in the young NLS regressions: train- 
ing on the current job and training prior to the current job. Of these only 
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.068  2.61  .039 
.004  1.79  -.002 
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.013 
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1.39  ,035 
1.08  -  .002 
3.97  -.120 
2.62  .010 
1.01  -.005 
.74  -.008 
3.41  ,056 
3.56  .021 
3.84  .172 
-  .043 
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-  .056 
-  .004 
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-  .032 
.002 




-  .011 
.002 
-  ,046 
,151 
-  .lo1 
,001 
14.79  ,408 
3.95  ,019 























.007  .35 
-  .001  .44 
-  .039  1.26 
,002  .43 
.054  .84 
-  .018  .46 
.028  2.28 
.005  1.21 
.076  2.14 
-  ,015  1.69 
,008  .01 
-  .073  1.04 
.lo5  2.58 
-  .061  1.45 
-  .022  .41 
.035 
,315 
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Table 8.10  The Determinants of the Incidence of Separation 
for White Men, MID,  1975-76 
P  t  P  t  P  t 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
CONST  .266  .228  .452 
X2  .OOO2  2.58  .OOO1  1.98  .010  1.70 
T2  .OOO2  1.44  .OOO3  1.95 
LOCRA TE  .001  .20  .001  .48 
PSEP  .166  3.02  .136  2.44 
PCOND  .124  2.85  .094  2.05 
EDUC  -.010  2.74 
HL  TH  .090  2.64 
GOV  -.027  1.22 
UNION  -.024  1.18 
MARRY  -.073  2.38 
PTIME  -.I22  2.24 
OLF  -.070  1.59 
X  -.010  3.92  -.007  2.37  -.007  2.42 
T  -.010  2.51  -.012  3.07 
RZ  ,024  .056  ,075 
F  .149 
n  1562 
specific capital grounds, it reduces both separations and unemployment 
incidence. 
Unemployment incidence is positively affected by  the local level of 
unemployment which, however, does not affect separations. This finding 
appears in the NLS regressions for young men in both periods (1969-71 
and 1967-69) and in MID regressions for 1973-74  and less strongly for 
1975-76.  We also find that the local rate is not related to quits but is 
positively related to layoffs. These findings suggest that differences in 
local unemployment reflect differences in local demand for labor some- 
what more clearly than differences in turnover. It it were turnover only, 
local rates would  be  positively related  to separations, which  is not 
observed.  If  only  labor demand  differs, there  would  be  no  relation 
between the local unemployment rate and separations, a positive relation 
with layoffs, both of  which are observed, and a negative relations with 
quits, which is not observed. 
Both separations and unemployment incidence are negatively related 
to education and to marital status among the young. Short hours (part- 
time work) and nonparticipation some time during the year (or in prior 
years) are associated with higher probabilities of separation and of unem- 
ployment in the young NLS data and in the MID data for 1973-74.  (In 
1975-76  part-timers appear to have fewer separations and the effect of 
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.013  1.17 
-  .OOO3  1.28 
-  .o001  .@I 
-  .OOo  .45 
.020  1.69 
,076  .47 
.387  2.86 
-  .034  2.36 
-  ,009  .oo 
.051  .69 
-  .204  2.20 
-  .125  .46 
,239  1.33 
-  .042  .47 
.112 
.498 
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Table 8.12  The Determinants of Separations 
for Mature White Men, NLS  1969-71 
P  t  P  t  P  t 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
CONST  .478  .480  .294 
X  -.019  1.71  -.016  1.62  -.005  .56 
X2  .Ooo4  2.19  .OOO  1.89  .Ooo  .47 
T  -.019  4.85  -.014  3.97 
T2  .OOO4  4.08  .OOO3  3.29 
LOCRA TE  .003  .35  .004  .43 
PSEP  .177  18.66  .164  18.31 
PCOND  ,080  2.32  .021  .62 
EDUC  .003  .62 
HL  TH  .042  1.35 
GOV  -.083  2.48 
UNION  -.OOO  .oo 
MARRY  -.OM  1.41 
PTIME  .078  1.69 
OLF  ,505  15.22 
R2  .004  ,235  .326 
P  ,278 
n  1957 
Union membership reduces separations and has no significant effect on 
incidence, unless temporary layoff unemployment is included when the 
effect becomes positive. Employment in the government sector has a 
weak negative effect on separation and on unemployment in the young 
NLS, but both effects are stronger at older ages (MID and NLS). 
Bad health has no clear effects on separations and a positive effect on 
unemployment  incidence in  1967-69  in the young NLS sample. Both 
effects are positive in the MID but not clear in the older NLS samples. 
The following conclusions may be drawn. Regression results strongly 
support the turnover hypothesis of  unemployment incidence. To the 
extent that differences in job sorting and specific capital processes under- 
lie variation in labor mobility across people, they are important in creat- 
ing differential unemployment. Therefore both tenure dependence and 
heterogeneity are characteristic of  unemployment incidence as they are 
of separations. Factors which account for the convex (decelerating) de- 
cline of  the incidence of  unemployment with age are lengthening of 
tenure with age, change from single to marital status, and the shift from 
part-time and part-period work activities to full-time work. 
We should note the relevance of  marital status, part-time work, and 
nonparticipation in understanding the comparison with migrants in table 
8.5 (panel C). The transition from school to market and from parental to 
one’s own household which is observed in a cross-section  of young people 
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.004  .24 
-  ,000  .24 
.008  1.01 
.000  .01 
-  .002  .10 
,010  .98 
.lo2  2.04 
.010  1.30 
-  .lo2  1.77 
-  .155  1.89 
-  ,027  .46 
-  ,086  1.05 
-  ,085  1.10 
.051 
,367 
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tenure) compared to the experience of  largely adult migrants, whose 
work in the new labor market was the major reason for migration. 
A comparison of  unemployment P(u) regressions with separation 
regressions leaves out questions about the conditional probability of 
unemployment.  This  probability  P(u  Is)  enters  the  product  in 
P(u)  = P(s).P(u  Is). It was shown to increase with age in contrast to both 
P(s)  and P(u).  What are the factors associated with P(u  I s) and why does 
it increase with age? We try to estimate factors affecting P(u  Is) in two 
ways. In “augmented regressions” we add separation variables to all the 
others (col. 5 of  the tables) and study factors affecting unemployment 
given separations. The alternative procedure is to restrict the regressions 
to workers who moved, that is, to  job separators as well as to entrants and 
reentrants (col. 6). These we call “restricted regressions.” 
In both kinds of regressions the variables that remain significant are the 
local unemployment rate, prior conditional unemployment, marital sta- 
tus, education,  and, less clearly, part-time work. Union membership 
becomes positive and significant at least in the 1969-71  period. Similar 
results are found in MID regressions. The variables show higher t-scores 
in the restricted regressions (col. 6), but the bulk of “explanatory power” 
in the augmented regressions is due to the turnover variables. For exam- 
ple, in the 1969-71  NLS sample of young men these variables produce an 
R2 = SO5 which increases only to .521 when all the factors are added. 
Table 8.3  suggested that both separations and unemployment are more 
heavily weighted by  layoffs than by  quits at older ages. Some of  the 
variables that are significant in affecting  conditional unemployment in the 
regressions are apparently more closely associated with layoff unemploy- 
ment. This is true of the local unemployment rate, as already noted. Prior 
conditional unemployment must be weighted toward layoff, since unem- 
ployment conditional on layoffs is twice as high as unemployment con- 
ditional on quitting. The same holds for unemployment of  union mem- 
bers. However, education, marital status, and short hours affect both 
quits and layoffs and so affect the conditional in each type of separation. 
Altogether, the NLS regressions are not very helpful in explaining the 
age increases in conditional unemployment. Lower levels of  education 
and of  health and more  frequent union  membership among the old 
account for a part of it. The other variables have no or even opposite 
effects on age patterns. That the variables we were able to measure do  not 
account for the growth of conditional unemployment with age is apparent 
in observing the effects of  experience on incidence in the regressions 
restricted to job movers. The effect is positive in the older NLS (ages 48 
and over), and less so in MID (average age near 40) before and after all 
other variables are included. There are no experience effects in  the 
restricted  regressions within the first decade of  work experience (the 
young NLS sample). Evidently, the probability of unemployment, when 259  Labor Turnover and Youth Unemployment 
separating, increases at adult ages within each of the classes (levels) of the 
variables we have measured. 
8.6  Conditional Unemployment and Age Differences 
in the Duration of Unemployment:  A Search Model 
Although we are not able to ascribe much of  the higher conditional 
unemployment at older ages to the factors we have measured, we know 
that it is largely associated with the increased layoff/quit ratio. Why does 
quitting decline more rapidly at older ages than do layoffs? 
At given tenure levels a worker’s incentives to quit decline as he ages 
because the payoff period to  whatever benefit his quitting might produce 
is getting shorter. Furthermore, we suggest that potential job changers 
encounter a diminished probability of finding a job at older ages. There 
are several possible reasons for this. Short prospective tenure inhibits 
hiring by employers in the presence of hiring or  training costs. A record of 
job mobility at older ages is a deterrent to hiring for the same reasons, 
insofar as it suggests a higher probability of further separation as  it does in 
our findings. On the supply side, workers’ human capital, even if  not 
specific  to  the firm, becomes progressively more specialized  to a narrower 
cluster of firms within an industry or occupation. The proportion of job 
changers who also change industry and occupation diminishes at older 
ages 
In the terminology of search models, we argue that, on average, older 
workers who separate from jobs have a lesser probability of finding a job 
per unit of  search time, not because they are holding out for a higher 
acceptance wage within the relevant wage offer distribution (though it is 
true of some), but because the probability of getting any offer, that is, the 
probability of finding a vacancy, is smaller. On this assumption we can 
show that older workers who separate will search longer when unem- 
ployed, and quit less frequently, while their acceptance wage will be 
relatively lower, so the wage gain will be smaller (or negative) for older 
job movers than for younger ones. 
In the standard search model, the individual samples from his wage 
offer distribution f(w)  receiving one offer per unit of  time. The worker 
decides on an optimal wage floor which equates the gain from an addi- 
tional unit of  search to the cost of  it. The resulting rule is: 
(7)  P,(W,-W,)=c=W,-z 
where W,  is the lowest acceptable wage, P, is the probability of getting an 
acceptable wage offer, that is, of  W? W,,  W,  the mean of all acceptable 
wage offers; c is the (marginal) cost of search which includes opportunity 
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Income offsets z  which are contingent on continued  search, such as 
unemployment compensation or the current wage when searching on the 
job, enter costs with a negative sign. Duration of search D  is inverse to Pa. 
In this model search is longer the higher the acceptance wage, which is 
higher the lower cost of  search. 
Now the probability of accepting a wage offer must be redefined given 
that the probability of finding any offer in a unit period can be less than 1. 
A lesser frequency of  vacancies may be a result of  depressed business 
conditions in general, or depressed markets for a particular type of labor, 
or a function of  lesser efficiency or intensity of  search. The optimum 
condition becomes: 
(8)  p-Pa  (W,  -  W,) = c = w,  -  z 
Here p is the probability of  finding a job offer, Pa the probability of 
finding an acceptable job conditional on finding a vacancy, andp.  Pa is the 
probability of  finding an acceptable job.  D is now the inverse of  the 
product p-P,. As before, changes in c produce a positive relation be- 
tween  W, and D. However, changes in p over the business cycle or 
otherwise, or differences in p across people, tend to produce a negative 
correlation between W, and D. 
A reduction in p leads to a downward revision of  W,,  hence to an 
increase in Pa. The question is whether p-P, will rise or fall in (8). No 
perfectly general answer can be given to this question, but a most plausi- 
ble answer is that  @-Pa)  will fall, hence the duration of  search will 
lengthen even though W,  is revised downward in consequence of a fall in 
P.~  It is easy to see that the difference (W,  -  W,)  increases as W, is 
lowered in a uniform or triangular wage offer distribution. When W, is 
reduced, w,  is reduced by a smaller amount, so thatp-Pa  must fall if c is 
fixed or reduced. Actually, c will be reduced since lowering of  W, will 
lead to a fall in foregone wages when search is continued. 
An increase in (w,  -  W,) implies an increase in the ratio ma/  W,  when 
W,  is reduced. It can be shown that d(w,l W,)ld W,  SO for a wide class of 
functions.  Consequently, our conclusions hold  more  generally since 
equation (8) can be rewritten in ratio form: 
(9) 
wa  Z  pap,  (--  1) = 1 -- 
wa  wa 
Only an unusually high skew in the distribution, such as in the Pareto 
distribution, yields a fixed w,/  W,  whatever the position of W,. Even then 
pep,  will fall as does the right-hand expression. 
The conclusion that a lower p is very likely to produce longer search 
and lower acceptance wages holds both for unemployed and for em- 
ployed searchers. In the latter case, c = W, -  W,, where W,  is the wage 
paid on the job. An increased duration of  search on the job, of  course, 
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In sum, workers facing fewer vacancies in their search may be expected 
to have a longer duration of search and a lesser wage gain when unem- 
ployed, and to inhibit their job change (quitting) when employed. These 
conclusions are consistent with  worker  behavior  during the business 
cycle: duration of unemployment increases and quits decline while layoffs 
increase, partly  because employment demand  declined and partly to 
substitute for a decline in attrition (quits). Note that in contrast to other 
models this explanation of  behavior during the business cycle does not 
assume myopia or lags in adjustment." 
Applying the same model to the life-cycle, we may argue that either p 
or  c declines at older ages. A decline in cis not plausible except very early 
when labor market entrants become eligible for unemployment com- 
pensation. A decline in c would lead to increases in W,  and in wage gains, 
but the opposite is implied by a fall inp  and is observed. The implications 
that older men have a longer duration of unemployment, a reduced Q/  L 
ratio, and a lower W,  when changing jobs are strongly confirmed by the 
data in table 8.14. The shorter duration of unemployment of the young is 
also due partly to relatively frequent interlabor force mobility. Again, 
this is characteristic of very early labor force behavior and cannot account 
for the age-uptrend in duration of  adult unemployment. Nor can this 
upturn be ascribed to the somewhat longer duration of layoff than of quit 
unemployment. Duration increases with age in both cases. Table 8.14 
shows that a similar search interpretation can be given to unemployment 
differentials by race and, somewhat less clearly, by education. We elabo- 
rate on the race differentials in the next section. 
Although we have no direct evidence on the reduction of p at older 
ages, P(ulL)  may be a good index. It increases with age, is inverse to 
education, and is higher for blacks. The only exception is that P(u  I L)  is 
Table 8.14  Conditional Unemployment and Duration NLS, 196749 
(excludes temporary layoffs and students) 
Average 
P( UIS)  P( UI  L)  QIL  duration  Aw 
Young whites  .342  .573  4.66  5.30  316 
Education 
0-11  ,423  .641  4.26  5.74  .827 
12  .329  .546  4.78  5.20  ,842 
213  ,218  .471  5.36  3.93  ,744 
Young blacks  .525  ,607  3.03  6.33  ,608 
Mature whites  ,382  ,623  1.62  9.99  ,658 
Education 
0-11  ,443  .655  1.25  9.90  ,543 
12  .313  .640  2.20  10.29  ,322 
213  ,268  ,385  3.00  10.03  1.830 
Mature blacks  .519  .725  1.17  11.35  .414 
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less for the older, more educated whites compared to young whites in the 
same category. 
In sum, as large as they are, age differentials in unemployment rates 
are attenuated  by  the longer  duration of  unemployment  and higher 
probability of unemployment of older movers. Both the longer duration 
and the higher conditional probability of unemployment of older men can 
be ascribed to the decline in the probability of finding vacancies at older 
ages. Young white job changers face, on average, a more favorable 
environment in this respect. 
8.7  BlacWWhite Differences in Youth Unemployment 
Black youth unemployment has grown relative to white youth unem- 
ployment over the past two decades or longer. A fuller understanding of 
the present differential, therefore, requires an analysis of this trend. This 
is beyond the scope of our present work. We did, however, replicate the 
statistical analyses on black data, and report some of  the findings. 
The salient features in the racial unemployment differentials are higher 
incidence, longer duration, and greater nonparticipation among black 
youths as shown in table 8.1.  Those differences hold for both students and 
nonstudents. Age comparisons in 1966-67 and 1967-69 show that the 
duration of  black youth unemployment is not much shorter than the 
duration of unemployment of older blacks. Since the race differential in 
duration of older men's unemployment is small, it is not clear whether 
our NLS sample of  older blacks understates their adverse position or 
whether our findings about  the  young are, indeed,  an indication of 
deterioration  of  labor market conditions in present  cohorts of  black 
youths. But these inferences are not mutually exclusive. 
The longer duration of black youth unemployment compared with that 
of white youths is mirrored in table 8.4 in higher conditional unemploy- 
ment at each level of tenure. The higher incidence of  unemployment of 
black youths is due both to the higher separation rates and to higher 
conditional unemployment at fixed levels of  tenure. The result is that 
while the black separation rates are 20% higher than the white rates, the 
black incidence of  unemployment is twice as high as the white. 
Table 8.14 shows also that the black conditional unemployment P(u  Is) 
is higher than the white largely because Q/L,  the quit/layoff ratio is 
lower,  and  also  because  both  conditional  P(ulL) and  P(ulQ)  are 
higher." Using the search model argument of  the preceding section, we 
may conclude that because blacks face a lower probability of  finding 
vacancies than do whites, their duration of unemployment is longer, wage 
gain smaller, and quitllayoff ratio lower. It has been noted that black quit 
rates are not higher than rates of whites.'*  In our interpretation, this does 
not suggest an equally stable work experience: total separations of blacks 263  Labor Turnover and Youth Unemployment 
are higher, but quits are inhibited because of  an adverse labor market, 
and some of the excess layoff is in part a substitution for reduced quitting. 
Some of the factors that appear to influence the higher black separation 
rates and their slower decline with experience are suggested in compari- 
sons of black and white regressions in tables 8.15 and 8.16. The effects of 
experience on separations and on unemployment incidence of blacks are 
not significant in the MID sample and are positive in the young NLS 
sample. These findings may  not be inconsistent,  since the quadratic 
experience term in the NLS black regression has a negative coefficient 
and implies that the positive effect vanishes within less than a decade (the 
MID sample is over a decade older). Similarly, tenure is not significant in 
the black MID sample, though it is negative and significant in the NLS 
sample of  young blacks. The tenure effects are somewhat weaker, and 
the effect of training on the current job is, if anything, positive rather than 
negative in the black sample. This suggests that blacks receive not only 
less training, but also a lesser specific component of  it. Marital status, 
which reduces separations of  whites, has little effect on separations of 
blacks in NLS and MID and on unemployment of blacks in MID. Educa- 
tion reduces unemployment of  blacks for 1973-74  but not for 1975-76 in 
the MID sample. At the same time, prior unemployment conditional on 
separation predicts future separations more sharply among blacks than 
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among whites; that is, black movers who encounter unemployment are 
more likely to separate from jobs than are those who move without 
unemployment and more than comparable whites. Taken together, these 
effects may  also explain why  over the early years of  experience the 
decline in separations and in unemployment incidence is not pronounced 
among nonstudent blacks when it is for whites. 
So much  for the differential regression effects as estimated in the 
regression coefficients. Differential characteristics of  black youths also 
contribute to the higher unemployment. On average, black youths had 
less tenure, less training, lower education, fewer marriages, and more 
part-time and intermittent work. 
In our  regression,  which  was  designed to spot factors  influencing 
conditional unemployment, the clues that might explain why such unem- 
ployment is higher for blacks are sparse. Education  has no effect on 
blacks while it is negative for whites. Again, the likely conclusion is that 
the conditional unemployment of  blacks is higher because their  quit/ 
layoff ratio is lower at all levels of  the factors. 
Our findings convey some impressions of  greater job instability of 
blacks which is partly due to less training, to fewer specific components of 
job experience, to greater nonparticipation, and to weaker effects of 
education and of family status. Greater difficulties in  job finding are 
consistent with longer duration of unemployment, inhibition of quits, and 
augmentation of  layoffs. We do not know, however, how much of  the 
difficulties are matters of discrimination, of  perception of potential pro- 
ductivities by employers, or of  informational efficiency of job search. In 
contrast to the whites, unemployment of  young blacks is higher than 
unemployment of  older blacks at fixed tenure levels as we noted in table 
8.4. Also, the race differential in duration is larger at younger than at 
older ages. Both of these findings may be a reflection of the deterioration 
in labor market conditions of  recent cohorts of  young blacks. 
8.7.1  Plus Fa  change . . . ? 
A 1969 survey of research on youth labor markets concluded that “the 
normally high level of teenage unemployment is due primarily to the fact 
that so many teenagers are labor market entrants or reentrants rather 
than to their deficiency or instability as empl~yees.’’’~  We amend this 
conclusion by  interposing a continuum of  job experience and showing 
how it  translates into a decelerating  age decline in  the incidence of 
unemployment. 
Our evidence is based on far richer data than were available to the 
researchers in the 1960s. But we do face a question of data comparability: 
the NLS shows lower unemployment rates for young nonstudents, conse- 
quently a smaller age differential than does the CPS. Yet our finding no 
“aging effects” is also reproduced in the MID data, apart from being 266  Linda Leighton and Jacob Miocer 
consistent with the spirit of  the conclusion reached a decade ago on the 
basis of  fragmentary, cross-sectional CPS aggregates. 
Notes 
1. Appendix tables available on request. 
2. When not shown in text tables, the findings appear in appendix tables. 
3. The educational differences are stronger in the 1966-69 period. 
4. This measure has sampling properties akin to the likelihood ratio, according to R. 
Shakotko. We do not explore these issues. 
5. dTldx = (1 -s) -  Ts>O, and dZTldx2<0. For argument and evidence see Mincer 
and Jovanovic (1979). 
6. White nonstudent job quitters report a probability of  unemployment of  ,313 for 
1967-69 compared with .213 for mature men. For blacks these figures are SO3 and .333 
respectively. 
7.  Equation (6) is an intermediate step between col. (1) and (2) in table 8.11. 
8.  Unpublished work of  Bartel and Mincer. 
9. The same conclusion was reached independently by S. Nickell (1978). 
10. See Alchian in the Phelps (1970) volume. 
11.  Seen. 6. 
12. Flanagan (1978). 
13. Kalachek (1969), p. 2. Although the quotation refers to all teenagers as a group, the 
special problems of  black youths were noted by  Kalachek as well. 
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Comment  Alan L. Gustman 
The major concern of this chapter is the question of why youth unemploy- 
ment declines from the relatively high levels observed for male teenagers 
not enrolled in school’to the lower levels experienced by  adults. To 
provide an answer, the authors disaggregate unemployment into def- 
initional components and relate these to explanatory variables which 
themselves  are related  to age.  Closely interweaving theoretical  and 
empirical considerations, they extend the human capital approach and 
apply it to analyze the unemployment-age relation. In so doing, Profes- 
sors Leighton and Mincer provide needed emphasis on theory in an area 
that has been characterized mainly by empirical inquiry with little theo- 
retical grounding. 
While there are a number of  findings, the basic conclusion is that the 
decline with age in unemployment, rapid at first and then decelerating, 
stems from a similarly shaped decline in the probability of  a separation 
with tenure on the youth’s last job. Thus high youth unemployment is 
attributed to short tenure on a particular job rather than to the youth’s 
age or limited overall labor market experience. The process of matching 
employers and employees, and the subsequent arrangement to share the 
costs and benefit of  specific training if the match is successful, play the 
central theoretical role. They suggest that “it  is not the behavior or 
circumstances peculiar to the young, but the dynamics of  ‘experience 
search’ in the labor market which is largely independent of  age [that is 
responsible for their high unemployment incidence]  .” High youth unem- 
ployment, at least among white youths, is not the result of unemployment 
being high at any given level of  tenure, reflecting “young age and un- 
stable behavior,” but is a result of  low youth tenure. 
The conclusion that age and overall market experience do not play a 
very important role is an empirical one. Nothing in the theory excludes 
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the possibility that young age and overall inexperience might account for 
an important part of high youth unemployment. For example, one could 
well integrate screening on the part of  employers based on age and 
experience into the discussion. A finding that age and experience played 
an important independent role would square with the impression about 
employer attitudes created by past interview data. From these it appears 
that some firms in some industries are reluctant to hire young people, let 
alone to train them (e.g., see Lester 1954, pp. 53-6 and Barton 1976). 
Young people may be viewed as accident-prone, not trustworthy with 
expensive equipment,  and likely to let their  attention wander. As a 
result, they  may  be less likely to secure a position which  offers an 
extensive amount  of  specific training.  The authors’ finding of  lower 
separations and unemployment  for married  people  reflects the more 
stable behavior of married young people and perhaps also the response of 
employers which makes positions offering opportunities for specific train- 
ing more available to those who are married. But again, despite the fact 
that age or experience would be a good screen for unstable behavior and 
thus may have affected the availability of opportunities for accumulating 
specific training, according to Professors Leighton and Mincer’s  findings, 
past turnover and tenure constant, age or experience do not play a strong, 
independent role reducing the likelihood of  separations and unemploy- 
ment within the younger NLS group. 
Some of the empirical evidence supporting the conclusions  that age and 
experience do not reduce separations and unemployment may be subject 
to question. In particular, the regressions fitted for black youths based on 
data from the NLS raise the most serious doubts. The results indicate not 
that general experience has a significant negative impact, but that, tenure 
and other factors constant, black youths have a significantly higher prob- 
ability of separation and of unemployment the higher the level of general 
labor market experience (see tables 8.15 and 8.16). To give an idea of the 
size of  these effects, the sum of  the products of  the coefficients of  the 
experience variables times their means exceeds the comparable sum for 
the tenure variables with their means. Similar but less severe problems 
arise in the identical regressions for white youths. There, too, the sign on 
the basic experience variable is positive in the separation equation, with a 
t-statistic above 1.4 for the linear experience term (table 8.8). In the 
analogous unemployment equation, the coefficient of  the linear experi- 
ence variable is also positive, with a t-statistic below 1 (table 8.9). In 
contrast to these findings, in regressions for white males of  all ages using 
data from the Michigan Income Dynamics Survey, the linear experience 
term has, more plausibly, a negative effect on the probability of a separa- 
tion (table 8.10). This effect is significant. Using the same data, the sign 
on the linear term is found to be negative in the analogous equations 
explaining the incidence of unemployment, but the coefficient estimates 269  Labor Turnover and Youth Unemployment 
are not significant. None of these tables indicates a significant effect of 
experience on the probability of unemployment conditional on a separa- 
tion. 
Let me mention  a possible reason  for the counterintuitive  results 
obtained in analyzing the NLS youth sample. Between 1966 and 1971, 
many young people were in the armed forces and were not sampled, and 
others who were sampled either were not eligible for the draft or may 
have altered their behavior expecting to be drafted. As a result, a dis- 
proportionate number of those with long experience may have been those 
who were turned down for military service. If  this is so, it means that the 
Parnes data for young men, covering as they do a period when labor 
market activities were interrupted for selected individuals, may not be as 
useful as they might for tracing the process of integrating young workers 
into the labor force during more normal times. Another question con- 
cerns what accounts for the differences between the findings for black and 
white youths. As the authors note, some of the differences may reflect 
differences in the specific training received by each group, even at similar 
levels of tenure. A part of the explanation may also arise from differences 
in the way the draft affected individuals in each group. 
Suppose the authors’ findings that job tenure importantly influences 
youth unemployment, but age and overall labor market experience do 
not, is supported by further evidence. If  this is so, I believe the implica- 
tions for policy makers may be quite severe. Consider the finding that 
tenure plays a dominant role and that young people respond no differ- 
ently from others with similar characteristics who are also new to the 
market. To reduce youth unemployment, at least that associated with 
permanent separations, one may have to improve the basic sorting pro- 
cess or, if  possible, find a way to make employers take on the risk of 
increasing specific investment  in younger workers beyond what they 
normally do, perhaps by  providing a more reliable signal about new 
workers than is currently available. This is a difficult task. 
A finding that market experience is not significant, tenure and past 
turnover constant, would not be very encouraging either. There is no 
reason to believe that general training per se reduces turnover. But one 
might think that the costs of  specific investment can be reduced and 
search made more efficient by increasing the information the youth has 
about the nature of the labor market before he or she engages in serious 
job search, Aside from their direct training content, such programs as 
career education, cooperative vocational education, and other programs 
designed to provide work experience might be expected to increase a 
young person’s knowledge of  the market and of  work. As a result, the 
youth may be less likely to find that a job he or she has chosen to  sample is 
very different from what was expected, and may thus not be disappointed 
and quit. If  early quttings were reduced by  these programs, new em- 270  Linda Leighton and Jacob Mincer 
ployees who had completed the programs would constitute a less risky 
investment prospect for the firm. Once firms became aware of this, these 
young people would have a greater probability of finding specific training 
opportunities that ultimately reduce  turnover. But one who strongly 
believed that these programs do improve the matching process would, in 
all probability,  also expect that, turnover behavior constant, market 
experience informs the youth of what the labor market is like and makes 
the individual a better risk for specific investment. While one cannot infer 
from a finding that past experience will facilitate specific training that 
other labor market information programs will have a similar result, an 
advocate of programs promoting early labor market experience might be 
troubled justifiably by the finding that past labor market experience does 
not, tenure and past turnover behavior constant, reduce separations and 
unemployment. 
An additional point should be made. In further attempts to test the 
author’s model with a more suitable sample, it would be of interest to see 
the effect of measuring experience by something like total time at work in 
a civilian job, or both civilian and military employment, rather than the 
number of  years since beginning the first job after leaving full-time 
school, the measure used by the authors. It is important to be sure the 
findings with respect to the role of  experience are not sensitive to the 
definition of  the experience variable. 
In closing, let me note again that the chapter by Professors Leighton 
and Mincer contributes importantly to our understanding of the working 
of  the youth labor market.  It also provides a fruitful framework for 
analyzing policy. While scattered theoretical and empirical pieces and 
folk wisdom have been available, the extensive analysis contained in this 
paper provides a “critical mass” which can form the basis for much of our 
future work. 
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Comment  W. Kip Viscusi 
Several recent analyses have documented the effects of  age and firm- 
specific experience on worker turnover aiid unemployment. The princi- 
pal contribution of the Leighton-Mincer chapter is that it greatly extends 
our knowledge of both the direction and convexity of these relationships. 
With the exception of some aberrant age-separation results,’ the empiri- 
cal patterns of  interest are established quite firmly. 
What is less clear is how one should interpret these findings. Most 
particularly, the age-related decline in worker separations is due largely 
to the increase in firm-specific  experience (tenure) with age, which in turn 
diminishes turnover. Although the econometric effects are clear-cut, age 
nevertheless may be important. Workers who are older may be more 
mature, better motivated, and better matched to appropriate jobs. Even 
though tenure per se may have no substantive impact, these age-related 
effects would diminish worker turnover, increase the value of the tenure 
variable, and generate the observed relationship. Indeed, it is impossible 
to construct any model with age affecting turnover in which tenure also 
doesn’t increase, since lower turnover increases one’s firm-specific ex- 
perience. 
The substantive impact of  the pivotal tenure variable is difficult to 
assess. However, as I will note later, excessive attention to this issue may 
lead one to ignore the primary insight provided by the human capital 
literature regarding worker turnover. 
Search, Experience, and Age 
One of the more intriguing findings is the lengthening of the duration of 
unemployment for older workers. Although this effect may be attribut- 
able in part to an adverse selection problem, it  may also reflect an 
important aspect of  the employment process. Considerable recent atten- 
tion has been devoted to job search among alternative wage offers. In 
reality, workers are choosing among jobs with uncertain implications, 
such as the likelihood of promotion or being injured. Here I will sketch a 
simple model which is the first analysis to incorporate both job search 
among lotteries and adaptive worker behavior once on the job.2  A major 
implication of this framework is that workers may substitute labor market 
search for on-the-job experimentation as they age. This behavior would 
generate both the observed relationship between age and the duration of 
unemployment as well as the higher turnover by  youths. 
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Consider the following  model with three periods and two types of jobs. 
In each period the worker can choose to remain on his job or search for an 
alternative job. Search takes one period, is associated with a cost of -  c 
(where c may be negative if the value of  leisure exceeds direct search 
costs), and offers a probability q that a type 1  job will be found and 1 -  q 
that a type 2 job will be found. 
In every period, each job offers some probability of  a successful job 
outcome with wage w  and a probability of an unsuccessful outcome with 
wage w‘,  where w >  w’.  Job 2 is preferred since it offers a prior probabil- 
ity of successp2, which exceeds the comparable valuep, for  type 1  jobs.3 
These independent priors are updated in  Bayesian fashion based  on 
experiences with that type of  job. Let yi  be a measure of  the worker’s 
prior information for job i. For probabilities belonging to  the beta family, 
the posterior probability of success pi(m,  n)  after m  successful outcomes 
and n unsuccessful outcomes on that job type is given by 
YiPi + m  pi(m,  n)  = 
yi+m+n 
so that 
aPi(l,O) <  0 and api(0, 1) >  0 
aYi  aYi 
The final bit of  notation is that B is the discount factor. 
Several features of the optimal strategy should be noted at the out~et.~ 
First, one never leaves an uncertain job after a favorable job outcome. 
Workers will be motivated to quit and undertake a job search only after 
unfavorable experiences. Second, since search takes a period of  time, it 
will never be optimal to search in period 3. Searchers in period 2 will 
accept whatever job is generated by  their search in that period since 
continued search will be unattractive. Third, workers will never leave a 
job because of an adverse experience after period 1. The period required 
by search makes quitting followed by  subsequent search unproductive 
after the initial period. In short, search may be optimal in periods 1  and 2, 
whereas on-the-job experimentation may only be optimal in period  1. 
Time horizon effects create a bias toward search as opposed to on-the-job 
experimentation as the worker ages. The analysis below will  focus on 
other age-related effects that reinforce this pattern. 
Suppose the worker has the option of  choosing between job 1  or job 
search with three periods remaining. Utilizing the above results regarding 
the nature of behavior, the value V‘  of  job 1  is given below. 
V’ = [P1  w + (1 -P1)W’I  + fiPl[Pl(L 0)w 
+ (1 -  Pl(L O))w’l(l + (J) 
+ (1 -PIP Mm {[PI(O,  1)w 273  Labor Turnover and Youth Unemployment 
+ (1 -PA  O))W‘l(l  + B), 
-  c +  qB[P,(O, 1)W + (1 -P1(0,  1))W’l 
where the first bracketea expression is the expected first period reward, 
the second is the discounted expected reward in periods 2 and 3 following 
a successful period  1 outcome, and the final term represents the only 
subsequent decision facing the worker who starts on job 1. Following an 
unfavorable outcome, the worker must choose whether he will remain on 
job 1 thereafter or search for an alternative job in period 2. The condition 
for undertaking a job search simplifies to 
+  Pl(0, 1)W + (1 -  Pl(0, 1))W’ 
If  the worker chooses instead to begin period  1 by searching, the 
discounted expected value v“ of  his choice is given by 
V  = -  c +  B(1 -  q)b2w + (1 -pz)w’](l  + b) 
+ Bq Max{- c + qBblw+ (1 -P1)W’] 
+ (1 -  q)fl[P2w + (1 -  P2)Wfl, blW 
+ (1 -P1)Wfl(l + BN 
where the worker incurs a search cost c, has a probability (1 -  q) of 
finding a job of type 2 for work in periods 2 and 3, and a probability q of 
finding a type 1  job that he either accepts or rejects in favor of continued 
search. The unsuccessful searcher will continue his search in period 2 if 
+  P1W + (1 -  Pl)  W‘ 
Consider  the search  decision in  period  2.  Since ~~(0,  l)<pl, the 
worker is more likely to search after an unfavorable job experience than 
after search in period 1, as comparison of  equations 1  and 2 indicates. 
Work on the job provides a motivation for additional job search. 
A particularly striking feature of equations 1  and 2 is that V  is indepen- 
dent of  the sharpness yi  of either prior probability, whereas V,  is indepen- 
dent of yi only if  the worker will never find it optimal to leave his job, as 
onecanverify bysubstitutingfor the betavaluesofpl(O, 1) andpl(l,  0). If 
job search is preferred to remaining on job 1  after an unfavorable job 1 
outcome, then dV1ldyl  <O.  The attractiveness of  work on job 1 declines 
with the precision of  the worker’s prior beliefs. To the extent that the 
worker’s experiences lead to a sharpening of  yi with age, the attractive- 
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from the change in one’s time horizon with age, there will be an age- 
related experience effect that diminishes the value of on-the-job experi- 
mentation and has no effect on the value of  search, so that search will 
become a relatively more attractive mechanism for finding an optimal job 
match. 
Both the high turnover of youths and the greater longevity of search by 
older workers are consistent with a hybrid model of search and adaptive 
behavior. The shortening time horizon with age will diminish the attrac- 
tiveness of on-the-job experimentation before it makes search unattrac- 
tive. Moreover, independent of  any time horizon effect is the role of 
worker learning, which enhances the relative value of  search as a form of 
information acquisition and labor market sorting. 
Toward a General Theory of  Turnover 
Leighton and Mincer are quite eclectic in their discussion of the theo- 
retical underpinnings of  turnover, utilizing diverse insights from human 
capital theory,  search theory,  and sorting and matching theories.  A 
central issue in any analysis is the substantive effect of the tenure variable 
on separations. Consider two extreme models. In  a standard human 
capital framework, the tenure variable would reflect specific training that 
enhanced  the  worker’s  firm-specific productivity.  In  a  pure  sorting 
model, the worker’s productivity may not have been altered with experi- 
ence, but he is  more likely to be matched  optimally to a job as his 
on-the-job experience  increase^.^ Workers who discover that the job 
match  is  inappropriate  have  left  the  enterprise,  and  the  optimally 
matched individuals remain. 
Although these theories differ sharply in the process generating the 
tenure effect (training versus a lottery outcome), they share a common 
feature. Let us define “specific information” as experiences that affect 
one’s probabilistic beliefs, only regarding the attractiveness of  work at 
the firm, while “general information”  also affects one’s probabilistic 
beliefs about work elsewhere.6 The learning in the adaptive model pre- 
sented earlier was specific. 
Specific information reduces the worker’s incentive to quit since subse- 
quent adverse experiences are less likely to diminish the job’s attractive- 
ness and lead him to quit. In contrast, general information has an ambig- 
uous effect.7 Even favorable experiences may lead to worker turnover 
since the relative attractiveness of work elsewhere may have increased. 
Moreover, worker turnover is always greater with general information 
than specific  information. A firm’s learning about the worker’s productiv- 
ity is quite similar. The firm is less likely to terminate an employment 
relationship  if  it has substantial knowledge about the worker’s firm- 
specific capabilities, whereas knowledge concerning the worker’s capa- 
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ductivity of  other workers in the employment situation  may  lead to 
greater  termination of  the economic matchups by  the firm. As with 
worker learning, turnover is negatively related to the specific  information 
component. 
These parallels suggest that the elusive search for a determination of 
the operative mechanism in the human capital theory may not be the 
appropriate focus. The theory’s primary insight relating to turnover is the 
importance of  specific as opposed to general learning. This distinction 
plays a pivotal role in pure sorting and adaptive behavior models as well 
as in analyses of  actual training processes. 
Notes 
1. See, for example, the findings for young black men in tables 8.15 and 8.16. 
2.  This model extends my earlier work in which a search process was not included as part 
of  the job choice problem. See, for example, Employment Hazards: An Investigation of 
Market  Performance, Harvard Economic Studies Series no.  148. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1979. 
3. The precision of  each prior is also assumed to be such that job 2 is preferred. As the 
discussion below indicates, in the case considered, only the precision y1  is of consequence. 
4. Many of  these properties are formalized in my  earlier work cited in n.  2. 
5. Sorting models may include specific human capital investment as part of the process, 
but they need not. 
6. This analysis is developed more fully in my  paper, “Specific Information, General 
Information, and Employment Matches under Uncertainty,” NBER  Working Paper no. 
394 (1979). 
7. This is the case of interdependent prior beliefs considered in chapter 4 of my Employ- 
ment Hazards volume cited in n. 2. This Page Intentionally Left Blank